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ARTICLES 




In this paper I will suggest a definition of humanitarian inter­
vention, give a brief historical overview of the debate about the 
legality of humanitarian intervention, and my conclusions on that 
question. I will only touch on the main points; the space allotted 
does not permit in-depth analysis. 
II. DEFINITION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
The definition of humanitarian intervention I suggest is: The 
use of force by one state in the territory of another to protect per­
sons who are in imminent danger of death or grave injury when the 
state in whose territory they are is unwilling or unable to protect 
them. First, there must be a threat of imminent death or grave 
injury. Second, the territorial state must be unwilling or unable to 
protect those endangered. A further requirement is that the inter­
vening state withdraw once it has rescued those in danger or other­
wise averted the danger. 
These criteria are similar to those listed by Professor 
Schachter for what he states is a "type of humanitarian interven­
tion" that is "generally accepted by jurists and many govern­
ments," a state's use of force "to rescue or protect its own nationals 
in imminent peril of injury in a foreign country."^ The definition 
proposed would not, however, limit humanitarian intervention to 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. This article is based on a 
paper presented at the Conference on Anarchy in the Third World, sponsored by the 
American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security, Washing­
ton, D.C., June 3-4, 1993. I wish to thank Esther Geuft, Cardozo '93, for her assistance 
with this paper. 
1 Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice: General Course in Public 
International Law, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS 144 (Hague Academy of International Law 
1982). 
2 CARDOZO J. OF INT'L c& COMP. LAW [Vol. 3:1 
the protection of nationals.^ The right of people not to be killed 
should not depend on whether the state of which they are citizens 
is in a position to protect them, wants to protect them, or is itself 
the source of the danger. Interestingly, the case which Professor 
Schachter considers "the classic application" of permissible human­
itarian intervention, the Israeli action in Entebbe^, was not limited 
to the rescue of Israeli nationals. 
Nor should it be a condition for the legality of the action that 
the intervening state is disinterested, as some have urged. States, 
like individuals, rarely act from purely idealistic motives.'' The test 
of the legality of the intervention should be the effect of the action, 
not the motive.^ As long as the action in fact prevented imminent 
death or injury and the intervening state withdrew once the danger 
was averted, its action falls within the definition of humanitarian 
intervention proposed, even if the state also had other motives. 
III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The debate about the legality of humanitarian intervention 
may be divided into three periods: Customary International Law; 
U.N. Charter; Post-Cold War. 
A. Customary International Law 
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention goes back a long 
time. In their monumental treatise on International Protection of 
Human Rights,® Sohn and Buergenthal quote from a book pub­
lished in 1579 which "justifies interference 'in behalf of neighbor­
ing peoples who are oppressed on account of adherence to the true 
religion or by any obvious tyranny.' Grotius, writing in 1625, 
asked "whether a war for the subjects of another be just, for the 
2 Accord Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT, IN­
TERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 41 (2d ed. 1991) ("The exception, I believe, is 
not restricted to actions by a state on behalf of its own nationals."); David Scheffer, To­
wards a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 272 (1992). 
3 Schachter, supra note 1, at 145. 
See RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, 
POLICY AND PRACTICE 627 (2d ed. 1991). 
5 Accord ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 222 
(1987). ("What may turn out to be decisively important is what happens after the interven­
tion.") (emphasis in the original). 
® LOUIS B. SOHN AND THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (1973). 
7 Id. at 138, citing W. A. DUNNING, POLITICAL THEORIES FROM LUTHER TO MONTES­
QUIEU 55 (1579), citing Vmdicae Contra Tyrannos. 
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purpose of defending them from injuries inflicted by their ruler, 
and answered that it is just if "a tyrant. . . practices atrocities to­
wards his subjects which no just man can approve."® 
There were also those who opposed humanitarian intervention 
under customary international law. They argued that such inter­
vention would be misused by one state to gain control over an­
other. Thus, an opponent of humanitarian intervention wrote; 
Barbarous acts are committed by the thousands every day in 
some comer of the globe which no State dreams of stopping be­
cause no State has an interest in stopping them. 
Whenever one power intervenes in the name of humanity 
in the domain of another power, it cannot but impose its con­
cept of justice and public policy on the other State, by force if 
necessary. Its intervention tends definitely to draw the [other] 
State into its moral and social sphere of influence, and ulti­
mately into its political sphere of influence. It will control the 
other State while preparing to dominate it. Humanitarian inter­
vention consequently looks like an ingenious juridical technique 
to encroach little by little upon the independence of a State in 
order to reduce it progressively to the status of semi-
sovereignty.® 
Nevertheless, Sohn and Buergenthal conclude that humanita­
rian intervention is lawful under customary international law. In 
their view, that conclusion is supported by "weighty authorities" 
and "various instances in which the powers have intervened to pre­
vent a neighbor from continuing to commit such abuses as consti­
tuted a violation of the universally recognized and generally 
respected rules of decent state conduct."^" 
B. U.N. Charter 
After the United Nations was established, the differing posi­
tions on the legality of humanitarian intervention took the form of 
disagreement about the correct interpretation of the Charter. 
Some publicists argued that even if humanitarian intervention was 
permissible before the adoption of the U.N. Charter, it was prohib­
ited by the Charter." They argued that Article 2(4) of the Charter 
9 Id. at 140-41, quoting A. Rougier, "La Theorie de I'intervention d'humanite," 17 
RGDIP 468, 525-526 (1910). 
10 Id. at 140. 
11 See, e.g., Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE 
MODERN'WORLD 217-228 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974); Louis HENKIN, HOW NATIONS 
4 CARDOZO J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 3:1 
bars all use of force by one state against another.^^ Other publi­
cists, however, took the position that the Charter did not prohibit 
humanitarian intervention." Three arguments have generally been 
offered in support of that position. First, one of the purposes 
stated in the Charter is to promote human rights." An interpreta­
tion of the Charter that prohibits humanitarian intervention would 
have the contrary effect." Second, Article 2(4) prohibits the threat 
or use of force against "the territorial integrity or political indepen­
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations." If a state intervenes to protect 
persons from imminent death or injury in another state, because 
the latter is unwilling or unable to do so, and then withdraws, its 
actions are not directed against "the territorial integrity or political 
independence" of the first state, or otherwise "inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations."^® Interestingly, even Profes­
sor Henkin, who has generally taken the position that the Charter 
"prohibits the use of armed force by one state on the territory of 
another ... for any purpose, in any circumstances,"^' would recog­
nize some instances of humanitarian intervention as lawful on this 
basis." The third argument is based on a state's right to use force 
in self-defense, affirmed in Article 51. If a state's citizens are at­
tacked or in imminent danger of attack in another state, its use of 
BEHAVE 144-45 (2d ed, 1979); Jost Delbrilck, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention 
Under the Authority of the United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887, 890, 892-93 (1992); Scheffer, 
supra note 2, at 258-59. 
12 Browniie, supra note 11, at 219; Henkin, supra note 2, at 41. 
13 See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Browniie and 
a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 230, 
236 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974); Michael Reisman & Myres S. McDougal, Humanita­
rian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED 
NATIONS 172,175 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973). 
1^ "The Purpose[s] of the United Nations are ... [t]o achieve international cooperation 
... in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights." U.N. CHARTER, art. 1(3); See 
also arts. 55, 56. 
13 Reisman & McDougal, supra note 13; FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTER­
VENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 158-59 (1988). 
1® Reisman & McDougal, supra note 13, at 177, citing U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(4); Rich­
ard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325-
34 (1967); John Norton Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in International Con­
flict, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 205 (1969). 
12 Henkin, supra note 2, at 40. 
18 Id. at 41-42. Thus, he stated, "But Israel could plausibly argue that in the circum­
stances its raid at Entebbe was not a use of force against the political independence or 
territorial integrity of Uganda, or in any other way contrary to any purpose of the United 
Nations." Louis HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 145 (2d ed. 1979). 
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force to rescue them constitutes lawful self-defense under Article 
51.1' There are two problems with the last argument; (a) it greatly 
broadens the concept of self-defense and (b) it limits humanitarian 
intervention to citizens of the intervening state.^" 
C. Post Cold War 
The tenor of the argument has changed somewhat with the 
end of the cold war. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, the fight­
ing and atrocities taking place in various parts of the world, have 
led some commentators to urge collective intervention under U.N. 
auspices.^i Others, however, oppose humanitarian intervention 
even by the U.N., or by states acting pursuant to U.N. authoriza-
tion.22 They argue that the only exception in Article 2(7) to the 
prohibition against intervention by the U.N. in matters that are 
"essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state" is for en­
forcement measures under Chapter VII; that Chapter VII applies 
only if the Security Council finds a threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression; and that as long as the state's con­
duct is not directed against another state it does not constitute a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression within 
19 Schachter, supra note 1, at 155; D. W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 91-105 (1958). . 
20 It is not apparent why, if a state whose citizens' lives are in danger is unable to rescue 
them, another state willing and able to do so should be prohibited from rescuing them. 
Even more egregious in my view is the position that a state that intervenes to rescue its 
own citizens may not rescue the citizens of other states. 
21 Scheffer, supra note 2, at 258-59, 265. See also, Report of the Secretary General on 
the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/46/ 
1 (1991). ("It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference with the essen­
tial domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which 
human rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity The case for 
not impinging on the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States 
would only be weakened if it were to carry the implication that sovereignty, even in this 
day and age, includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching systematic campaigns of 
decimation or forced exodus of civilian populations.") 
22 See Lori F. Damrosch, Commentary on Collective Military Intervention to Enforce 
Human Rights, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 215, 219 (Lori 
Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991); Tom J. Farer, An Inquiry into the Legiti­
macy of Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL OR­
DER 190-191 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991). While Boutros 
Boutros Ghali did not address the question directly, he did not re-affirm the strong word­
ing for humanitarian intervention in his predecessor's report in 1991, see supra note 20, and 
seemed to limit it to situations where there is "consent of the affected country." See An 
Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 
10 at para. 30, U.N. Doc. A/47/277 (1992). 
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the meaning of Article 39. Therefore, the Security Council cannot 
authorize intervention.^ 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because I agree with those who take the position that the U.N. 
Charter did not abolish the right of humanitarian intervention, I do 
not think that U.N. action is necessary to authorize it. Nor do I 
think that the Charter confers any special powers on the U N. to 
take action in this area. In this respect, I agree with those who take 
the position that Chapter VII of the Charter, which provides for 
the imposition of various sanctions by the Security Council, includ­
ing use of force against a state, is Umited to situations in which the 
Security Council finds that there is "a threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression" under Article 39. That language 
was clearly intended to apply to international threats to the peace, 
not to internal acts.^ The Security Council can, of course, take the 
position that the danger of imminent death or grave injury to a 
large number of persons within a state also constitutes a threat to 
international peace, as it did in condemning Iraq's repression of the 
Kurds in 1991," as it did in authorizing use of force in Somalia in 
1992 26 jjj today's interdependent world that may well be true in 
most—if not all—such situations." 
There is no objection to collective action under the auspices of 
the U.N., should states wish to do so. We should be wary, however, 
of limiting humanitarian intervention to collective action author­
ized by the Security Council. The legality of humanitarian inter­
vention should not be subject to the veto power of any one state. 
The right of the Kurds not to be murdered by Iraq, the right of the 
Somalis to receive the food sent to save them from starvation, was 
not any less the year before the end of the cold war than it was the 
23 See authorities cited supra note 21. 
24 See, e.g., Statement of the Australian representative to the San Francisco Conference, 
Doc. 969,1/1/39,6 UNCIO (1945), para. 16, that the last clause in what became article 2(7) 
of the Charter, excluding enforcement measures under Chapter VII from the ban on inter­
vention in matters that are within the domestic jurisdiction of a state was unnecessary, 
because "[t]o take enforcement action for the restraint of aggression is not intervening in 
any way at all in a matter of domestic jurisdiction." Id. at 440. 
25 S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 858 (1991). 
26 S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. (1992). 
27 In his Report on the Work of the U.N., Sec. Gen. Perez de Cueillar stated, "It seems 
to be beyond question that violations of human rights imperil peace," UNGA A/46/1 
supra note 20, at 10. 
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year after. Yet, under an interpretation of the Charter that would 
permit humanitarian intervention only if authorized by the Secur­
ity Council, the action taken to protect the Kurds and Somalis 
could not have been taken legally two years earlier and similar ac­
tion might not be legal two years from now, should one of the 
permanent members decide to veto it because of its own political 
interests.^® 
I believe the customary rule of humanitarian intervention, 
which permits unilateral action, should be reaffirmed. That some 
states may misuse that right to intervene in another state for other 
purposes, or fail to leave once the danger has been averted, is not a 
reason to prohibit legitimate humanitarian intervention, any more 
then we prohibit legitimate self defense, or any other right, because 
it may be misused. Every legal right can be misused. Obviously, 
where the right involves use of force the consequences are more 
serious but, so are the consequences of a failure to act when people 
are in imminent danger of death or serious injury.^' 
I believe, however, that humanitarian intervention should be 
defined narrowly and precisely both to get the broadest possible 
support for its legality^" and to avoid criticism, such as Professor 
Brownlie's, that "the opportunities for intervention will be very 
many."^^ I would, therefore, limit humanitarian intervention to sit­
uations in which there is danger of imminent death or injury, as 
stated earlier. That is not to say that intervention cannot be legal 
in other situations. I have argued elsewhere^^ that use of force in 
support of a democratically elected government which is barred 
28 The assumption that in the post-cold war era the veto will no longer be a problem 
may not be correct. The situation in Russia is still unstable. The long range position of 
China is unpredictable. Indeed, given the surprises of the last decade, even states we con­
sider predictable may not be. 
29 A state that uses force in another state based on unjustified claims of humanitarian 
intervention, or fails to leave once the danger is over, is, of course, violating article 2(4) 
and the Security Council can find that it has engaged in a threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression and take such measures as it deems appropriate under Chapter 
VII. 
30 Damrosch, supra note 21, at 215; "[T]he legal community has widely accepted that 
the Charter does not prohibit humanitarian intervention by use of force strictly limited to 
what is necessary to save lives." Henkin, supra note 2, at 41. 
31 Brownlie, supra note 11 at 226. 
32 See Malvina Halberstam, The Copenhagen Document: Intervention in Support of De­
mocracy, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 163 (1993). See also. The Committee on International Arms 
Control and Security Affairs and the Committee on International Law, The Use of Armed 
Forces in International Affairs: The Case of Pananut, 47 N.Y.C.B. ASS'N. 607, 698 (1992), 
dissenting statement of Malvina Halberstam. 
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from taking office or deposed by force is and should be lawful. I 
would not, however, include such use of force in the definition of 
humanitarian intervention. It was not included in humanitarian in­
tervention historically,^^ and, strong as the arguments are for the 
use of force in support of a democratic government, they are not as 
compelling morally as the arguments for the use of force to protect 
those in imminent danger of death or grave injury. Limited to in­
tervention to save those in danger of imminent death or grave in­
jury and coupled with a requirement that the intervening state 
withdraw once that has been accomplished, humanitarian interven­
tion is not only lawful but obligatory, certainly morally, and per­
haps, as Professor Tesdn argues very persuasively,^'* legally. 
33 See Hiomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L. 
L. 46, 84-85 (1992). 
34 Tes6n, supra note 15, at 111-23. 
